Abstract: Jason Brennan's Why Not Capitalism? provides a direct response to G.A. Cohen's moral defence of the value of socialism, arguing that, even under the utopian conditions Cohen specifies, capitalism would be recognized as the most attractive form of social organization. Yet, in one respect, Brennan's account of utopia seems oddly out of keeping with the capitalist system it is taken to represent: the freedom of the characters within it seems almost totally untouched by the pressure of competitive market forces. I argue that this absence cannot be explained simply by an appeal to the positive intentions of utopian individuals as, even with such motivations in place, competition would still be unavoidable. This means that, even if we agree with Brennan that people would want a utopia in which they had the greatest possible scope to pursue their own personal plans, they may still have good reason to reject his capitalist ideal in favour of a system that would secure for them fair terms on which to compete.
Introduction
G.A. Cohen's posthumously published Why Not Socialism? (2009) takes a slight form that belies the sizeable impact it has had upon political philosophy. The book expertly distils the force of Cohen's objections to capitalist society and his arguments for a more communal, egalitarian alternative, casting these claims in explicitly moral terms. It argues that most of our objections to socialism are about the practicality of a socialist form of society, not its moral value; yet we still allow such practical concerns to constrain our moral thinking. This, for Cohen, is a mistake: when thinking of the shape society should take, we should not allow our account to be coloured by human weakness, but should instead always hold the best imaginable form of social behaviour and organization as the standard by which we judge ourselves and our institutions. In the few years since its publication, the book has already prompted much analysis (Gilabert, 2012; Roemer, 2010; Ronzoni, 2012) , and has now also been met with a direct retort, Jason Brennan's Why Not Capitalism? (2014) . Skilfully using a similar form, style and focus to Cohen, Brennan argues that, even in this pursuit, when we seek society's optimal form, we have good reason to select a capitalist, as opposed to a socialist system.
The basis for this claim is that Cohen, according to Brennan, rests his argument on a fallacious and unfair comparison. An ideal form of socialism is held up alongside nasty behaviour characteristic of some of the least attractive features of actual capitalism, which is then taken to demonstrate the intrinsic moral superiority of socialism. Brennan argues that we should rather seek to compare ideal against ideal, and offers his own account of ideal capitalism to provide this comparison. Brennan holds that the normative value we place upon the ability to pursue personal plans makes his capitalist ideal more desirable than the alternative presented by Cohen, therefore committing us to a claim that, even in the ideal, capitalism represents the most intrinsically desirable socioeconomic system.
In this paper, I argue that, even if we agree with Brennan about the normative desirability of providing individuals with scope to pursue their own personal plans, Brennan's ideal example remains unable to demonstrate that capitalism is the most desirable system. This is because his account of utopia seems oddly out of keeping with the capitalist system it is taken to represent. For, while the characters within his example endorse market trade, their pursuit of plans is presented in a way that seems almost wholly free from the pressure of competitive market forces. I maintain, instead, that the presence of competition is unavoidable within a capitalist system and that this presence creates a significant potential source of constraint upon our pursuit of personal aims. Importantly, this competitive pressure is also not something that can be dissolved by appeal to good intention. And, if this is the case, then Brennan's claim that the well-intentioned denizens of utopia would endorse a relatively unhindered capitalist form of economic organization must be cast into doubt.
I begin with an examination of how Brennan develops his account of capitalist utopia in contrast to that of Cohen, noting the key points of difference between the two ideals and the way in which the arguments seek to provide support to their chosen system. Section 3 then draws attention to the absence of competitive pressure within Brennan's account of utopian capitalism. It rejects the claim that this could be ascribed to the positive motives of individual members of utopia, arguing instead that there is an ineliminably oppositional character to capitalist interactions. As a result of this, in Section 4 I argue that well-intentioned individuals who accept the importance of individual agency in pursuit of personal goals may not, as Brennan thinks, endorse a capitalist economic system, but may instead seek conditions that would secure them fair terms on which to compete.
Utopia -socialist and capitalist
Cohen's defence of socialism proceeds via a single simple thought experiment, used as a means to demonstrate the desirability of the principles of social organization it seeks to advance: a camping trip among friends, animated by a strong collective spirit. He argues, quite plausibly, that within such a scenario we would find it appropriate to distribute tasks and benefits in a reciprocal and egalitarian manner, and would expect each individual to consistently contribute according to their own capacities. Equally, we would be happy to find fault with any camper who sought instead to bargain for additional reward for their greater personal knowledge or individual abilities. From this, Cohen seeks to argue that the camping trip demonstrates the greater moral desirability of socialist forms of social interaction, when compared to those that animate capitalism. In turn, this leads him to conclude that our objections to socialism are not a matter of the attractiveness of its principles, but rather as to whether they can be feasibly implemented in the face of limits to human institutional imagination and motivational capability. Any reasons we have for embracing capitalism, on this view, are due to practical expediency in the face of our inability to access the most morally desirable ideal.
It is this latter claim that Brennan wishes to dispute, instead arguing that capitalism is itself an attractive moral ideal, rather than simply a grubby prudential compromise. To this end, Brennan's book explicitly mirrors the method used by Cohen, in that it begins with a single simple thought experiment. In place of Cohen's camping trip among friends, Brennan turns to the contemporary Walt Disney animation, the Mickey Mouse Clubhouse, using the village in which it is based as a means to demonstrate what capitalism might be at its best.
1 The village, made up of Disney characters such as Mickey and Minnie
Mouse, Donald and Daisy Duck, Goofy, Pluto, Clarabelle Cow and others, is outlined by Brennan in the following manner:
1 I will confess here a personal unfamiliarity with the Mickey Mouse Clubhouse TV show itself. It should be noted, therefore, that the following discussion, and all of the contentions I raise, are directed purely at the way the show's setting is described and presented within Brennan's argument.
There is no hierarchy among [the characters]. They have separate goals and projects, but also share common aims, such as the goal that each of them should have a fulfilling life and good time, doing, as far as possible, the kind of projects that they like best or find most meaningful. Some of these projects they do together; some they do separately. (Brennan 2014, p. 24) Further detail about their lives includes the facilities -some collective; some, such as Minnie Mouse's "Bowtique" hair-bow factory and shop, privately owned -they have available to them, and the principles of 'mutual concern, tolerance, and respect' (Brennan 2014, p. 24 ) that govern both their productive and their wider social interactions. This example is used to advance a critique of the form the argument takes within Why Not Socialism? Brennan believes Cohen is guilty of skewing the camping trip example in his favour by contrasting morally ideal socialist behaviour with morally flawed capitalist actions. So, Cohen contrasts the behaviour we would find acceptable on a camping trip with selfish demands for greater individual reward for personal contributions. But, Brennan argues, we can no more judge the superiority of socialism from this example than we could judge the superiority of capitalism from a situation in which the happy cooperation of characters under capitalist principles is contrasted with the socialist actions of Donald Duck in forcibly nationalizing available farmland, or in Goofy setting up gulags in order to stifle dissent. Instead, Brennan holds that, if Cohen wishes to demonstrate the superior moral attractiveness of socialism, his utopian socialist ideal -in which each person exhibits positive attitudes and prosocial motivation -must be compared against a similarly utopian account of capitalism.
Therefore, Brennan expands his account of the Mickey Mouse Clubhouse Village to provide a comparison in which the sort of domineering, exploitative or manipulative behaviour that often marks the reality of capitalist markets is absent. Instead, we might imagine that the characters who inhabit this utopia are as close to morally perfect as possible. So, 'capitalist factory owner Minnie Mouse would never exploit anyone, because she is too nice. Capitalist Minnie Mouse would never allow objectionable inequalities or a lack of opportunity, because she and others like her would give the deserving poor what they need. And so on.' (Brennan 2014, p. 86) To be fair in making a true moral assessment of differing principles of social organization, then, we should consider examples in which the individuals involved are other-regarding and socially compliant in their general attitudes. And, Brennan holds, once this more appropriate comparison is made, it would be capitalism, not socialism, that would prove more widely attractive.
At this point, it is worth giving some consideration to the form and structure of the arguments employed by Cohen and Brennan. In each book, ideal examples are constructed to facilitate a normative comparison of different forms of organization and behaviour in an attempt to demonstrate the greater attractiveness of the favoured set of ideas. Now, one of Brennan's main points is that Cohen's camping trip example does not provide us with a fair comparison for this choice, hence his attempt to provide a better alternative. Yet, to be truly effective, this form of argument needs to be able to demonstrate not simply the greater attractiveness of the principles the ideal examples advocate, but also that the underlying normative reasons for a judgement in their favour provide sound grounds for a broader endorsement of a specific form of socioeconomic organization. As a result, this form of argument is open to objection if it can be shown that the ideal example is significantly disanalogous with the form of life its principles are supposed to govern in wider society.
2 Equally, the argument may be called into question if the continuity of the example and the institutional form it is taken to support can be disrupted. In Sections 3 and 4, I will advance the latter form of argument against the capitalist nature of Brennan's utopian example. Yet, I first wish to give some further detail about the way in which Brennan proceeds in trying to demonstrate the normative desirability of capitalist institutions. The primary normative basis for Brennan's confidence in the greater attractiveness of capitalism is the value that people afford to their own agency in pursuit of personal plans. People 'have ideas and visions that they want to implement. Pursuing projects over the long term is often part (if not the only part) of what gives coherence and meaning to our lives.' (Brennan 2014, p. 78) 3 And, if it is the case that the pursuit of such individual ends is of vital importance to the value of people's lives, Brennan seeks to show that they will be best enabled by capitalist, as opposed to socialist, institutions.
So, for instance, the pursuit of individual projects will typically require access to certain objects or goods: Minnie Mouse's control over the materials and machinery in her Bowtique allows her to drive and shape the business according to her own will. And it aids her further that this control is to some degree exclusive; even if the other villagers are always happy to allow her access to the resources she needs (as Cohen would argue they would be in an ideal socialist community), the need to consistently obtain permission or to assess whether her choices would be compatible with the projects of others would prove an unwanted obstacle to her independent pursuit of her goals. This leads Brennan to conclude that 'the most effective way of making sure people have the objects they need for their projects is often to follow the rules of private property' (Brennan 2014, pp. 86f.) . Thus, even in a utopian situation, we would have reason to endorse rules that enforce private property rights, and may find this preferable to the type of arrangement that would be found on a camping trip, where goods are held in a communal manner.
In addition to the endorsement of private property rights, Brennan also thinks that, under utopian conditions, good reasons exist for allowing trade within a market system, on the grounds of the positive outcomes this could produce. Voluntary trades, particularly under utopian conditions, will typically be positive-sum games. That is, each party to a deal must see a gain from the transaction in order to endorse it -if they did not, they would instead simply exercise their freedom to walk away from the trade. So, market exchange represents a way for each and every individual to increase their own personal wellbeing. Yet, further to this, they also assist in improving conditions more generally, due to the informational benefit of market prices in the coordination of people's differing plans and the positive externalities of processes of trade.
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The affluent background conditions that would result from processes of market trade would enable the widest possible set of available options for individuals, aiding their ability to be effective self-authors. Finally, in order to make the most of the varied options opened up, Brennan holds that individuals should be granted the widest possible space of economic freedom. Brennan's argument, then, works to develop links between key institutional features of capitalism and the basic ability of individuals to pursue personal plans. Equally, he does so in ways that would still hold even if human motivations were of a perfectly utopian moral character, so that the institutions of capitalism cannot be written off as compromises with humanity's flawed nature. This allows him to hold up the example of the Mickey Mouse Clubhouse Village as a capitalist utopia that compares favourably with Cohen's camping trip, as it is better placed to enable individuals to realise their own individual ends. Thus, to the extent that we agree with the key normative claim -about the value afforded to the individual pursuit of personal projects -he wants to show we are also committing ourselves to the moral value of the capitalist vision of social and economic organization.
As outlined above, the three distinctive features of capitalism that Brennan wishes to justify are, (1) extensive private property, including property in the means of production, (2) voluntary trade of private property via markets, and (3) 'that every person possesses an extensive sphere of economic liberty in which she may make decisions as she pleases.' (Brennan 2014, p. 75) And what, at base, is taken to justify these three features is the degree to which they provide a conducive framework for the free pursuit of personal projects, while still coordinating behaviour in a beneficial way that allows others similar freedom to pursue their own ends. However, I wish to argue that even if we agree that social institutions should aim to facilitate individual freedom, we may still resist Brennan's claim that this would lead us to endorse capitalist institutions. The basis for this argument is that the utopian ideal described by Brennan is insufficiently capitalist to allow us to fully judge the desirability of a capitalist scheme of institutions. For, while Brennan characterizes his utopia as featuring extensive space for market trade, the characters within it seem remarkably free from the impact of market forces or competitive pressure: they simply pursue their own plans and respect the efforts of others to do likewise. But, I will argue, this ignores the role played within capitalism by competition between potentially conflicting plans -a role that will persist even under utopian conditions in which positive intentions are assured. Once this inevitable presence of competition within a capitalist system is acknowledged, I will maintain, it may be the case that the individual pursuit of personal projects is best enabled not by capitalism, but rather by arrangements that guarantee fair competitive practice.
To illustrate, I will examine Brennan's example of a capitalist utopia and focus on the case of Minnie Mouse in greater detail. In the village, Minnie runs her "Bowtique" -a hair-bow factory and store. Brennan tells us that 'it means something to her to control the Bowtique alone… because this gives her an avenue to exercise her talents and achieve excellence in a long-standing project.' (Brennan 2014, p. 79) In addition to this, it also 'means something to Minnie to be able to sell bows to others -that others are willing to buy from her because they like the bows rather than as a favour to her.' (Brennan 2014, p. 80) 5 In this presentation, Minnie's ongoing commitment to this project is secure: people do buy her bows, and in sufficient quantity to sustain her enterprise and provide her with personal fulfilment. But this should not be thought of as a given. Despite her enthusiasm for bow-making, if she is not very good at it and so unable to produce bows that people want to buy, this project could not form the basis of a productive economic contribution to the society of the village. This in itself is not a principal source of objection to capitalist form of productive organization. Indeed, it actually demonstrates one of the key coordinating functions of market systems. Each individual must seek to fit their own personal goals and talents to things that are valued by others. If Donald Duck deeply enjoys writing poetry, but the other villagers do not like the resulting poems, then they will not want him to spend all of his time writing. Instead they would wish for him to spend time on another project, while perhaps reserving writing for a personal pastime. By paying attention to the signals provided by market prices, and adjusting behaviour accordingly, available people -and their time, dedication and skills -come to be matched with necessary or valued roles. Such a mechanism is central to Brennan's definition of capitalism: people freely pursue their plans against a market background that provides them with specific incentives, information and opportunity for learning, which then allows for their efforts and activity to be effectively deployed in a way that would be impossible to achieve through direct productive planning. 6 But, it is not simply in regard to our personal plans and talents, or the efforts or products that are particularly valued by others that markets impact upon our plans. They also provide a framework for deciding whose plans take precedence when two or more individuals' projects come into conflict. Suppose that, while he currently owns a farm, Willie the Giant's long-standing dream is very similar to Minnie Mouse's: to design, manufacture and sell hair-bows. Now, he could pursue this goal by approaching Minnie to ask her to cooperate on a joint venture in bow making. Given the utopian character of the situation we can assume that personal conflict would not be a barrier to such a partnership: neither would seek to manipulate or double-cross the other as the partnership progresses. However, he may have different ideas to Minnie on hair-bow styling or materials. And, as previously discussed, key to Brennan's argument in favour of property rights is the claim that there is value to a person in pursuing their own personal plans in a way that is under their own control. So, although cooperation might be possible, we cannot demand that individuals compromise dedication to their own projects for the sake of others or for collective goals. Hence, were Willie to open his own store, "Bow Selector", in premises just down the road from Minnie's "Bowtique", Minnie would have no grounds for complaint.
Whether both bow store proprietors are able to successfully continue their involvement in the business would then be determined by the level of value that other members of the village place upon different types of hair-bows. There may only be sufficient demand to sustain a single bow retailer. Hence, Willie and Minnie would each have to try to outdo the other in order to realize their own dream, considering all of the different facets of bow-making -design, materials, production, supplies, retail -so as to give them each the best chance of eventual success. Now, some of the more common ways of critiquing capitalism might be illustrated within the example by having Willie use his imposing size with suppliers and potential employees as a bargaining tool to try to intimidate them and drive down the costs he has to pay. He could seek to push employees to work for longer than they have agreed, shortening or ignoring the breaks that they are due. Or he could act to cut costs wherever he can find savings: for instance by opting out of the village waste collection service, 7 and instead simply dumping the offcuts of material from his production at the rear of his store. When the wind blows, this would scatter these scraps of material throughout the village, creating work for the other villagers in clearing them up. These types of effort would make bows considerably cheaper at "Bow Selector" than at the "Bowtique". Beyond this, Willie could also produce adverts for "Bow Selector" that make disparaging claims about the quality of Minnie's merchandise. Of course, Brennan has an easy response to all of the above examples, as the behaviour described would not be present if Willie were properly intentioned and so they each move beyond the scope of what would occur under utopian circumstances: 'In utopian capitalism, you wouldn't have to worry about exploitation… In utopia, no one tries to corner the market through monopolies or monopsonies. In utopia, everyone gladly contributes his or her fair share to public goods' (Brennan 2014, pp. 89f.) . So, because Willie is stipulated as possessing strong ethical motivations, he would not engage in these types of unpleasant competitive practice. But, although many of these common criticisms would not apply to ideal capitalism, this does not necessarily mean that Minnie's plans within such an ideal would be free from competitive pressure. Even if Willie could not push his employees to extreme exertion, he could himself choose to work fourteen-hour days. Indeed, a successful business might be so central to his plans that he has no desire to spend his time in any other way, so does not perceive this to be a burden. Alternatively, even after setting up "Bow Selector", Willie may still have plenty of funds left over from the sale of the farm he previously owned, and so he may choose to sell his bows for only a minimal profit, intending to make them as easily available as possible.
But, in both of these cases, Willie's decisions are not simply Willie's business: they also impact upon Minnie and her "Bowtique". While the "Bowtique" may be massively important to Minnie's plans, her projects may be more varied, making her keener than Willie to spend time doing things other than working. Equally, not possessing the same level of background resources as Willie, Minnie may be far more dependent upon money made from her business, necessitating that her bows have a larger profit margin on them than do Willie's. In each case, the competitive situation means that Willie's freely made decisions pose a difficult choice for Minnie: either she follows Willie's example -working additional hours, forcing herself to live off smaller profit margins -or she places her business at a competitive disadvantage.
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It could, again, be suggested that the construction of this example moves away from the utopian conditions specified by Brennan, allowing him a similar escape to that open to him in the prior examples of Willie's intimidation of suppliers or exploitation of workers. If Willie was truly ethically motivated, this response might hold, he would be aware of the impact of his behaviour upon Minnie, and so could potentially exercise discretion over the extent of his competitive behaviour. After all, if the characters within this utopia are so benevolent that '[c]apitalist Minnie Mouse would never allow objectionable inequalities or a lack of opportunity, because she and others like her would give the deserving poor what they need' (Brennan 2014, p. 86) , then perhaps also capitalist Willie the Giant would refrain from competitive behaviour that would negatively impact upon his fellows' ability to pursue their own personal plans.
8 Note, my point here is not reliant upon an assessment that Willie wrongfully harms Minnie with his behaviour. Instead it demonstrates how his free choices, even if entirely permissible courses of action, constrain Minnie's chances to pursue her favoured plans, and may do so in ways that, ultimately, could be judged to become unfair. This point builds upon the Rawlsian idea of background justice where, without corrective efforts, 'the accumulated results of many separate and ostensibly fair agreements, together with social trends and historical contingencies, are likely in the course of time to alter citizens' relationships and opportunities so that the conditions for free and fair agreements no longer hold.' (Rawls 2005, p. 266) .
Additionally, I do not make the claim that there is something necessarily bad about Minnie's plans being constrained by Willie's actions. Instead, my claim is that, given Brennan himself rests the moral defence of capitalism upon its effectiveness at allowing individuals the best chance of realising their personal goals, he needs to be clear about the different potential sources of constraint that can come to compromise this aim and must also be prepared to admit the potential value of any alternative system that could secure this value more effectively than capitalism.
There are, however, a number of reasons why this response is not available to Brennan, revealing why, even under utopian conditions, competitive behaviour is unavoidable.
Avoiding collusion
The suggestion that Willie might voluntarily reduce the number of hours he works, or increase his profit margins so as to avoid harming Minnie's interests might, at first glance, appear consistent with the utopian picture of capitalism that Brennan wishes to present, where everyone cares not just for their own interests but also for the agency of others in pursuit of their own aims. However, while this response might potentially work if all exchanges were simply a matter of relations between two parties, it seems more problematic in widespread institutional systems of market exchange, where interests become interlinked such that personal agreements, arrangements or exchanges also impact upon third parties. For instance, when competition leads Minnie and Willie to both develop their products or reduce their prices, they are seeking to find small comparative advantages against the other's business to allow for an increase in market share. But, at the same time, these improvements also serve the interests of bow consumers, giving them cheaper or better quality bows. Any agreement or arrangement between the two of them, even if not for sinister motives, that would significantly restrict or curtail competition would therefore be to the detriment of these consumers. If Willie chooses to reduce hours or increase profit margin, Daisy Duck has to pay more if she wishes to purchase hairbows, leaving her less available money to spend on art materials for the landscape paintings she enjoys producing. If one character elects to reduce their competitive effort for the sake of their competitor's interests this is, in effect, an act of collusion that will harm parties elsewhere in the market.
Further to this, there are elements within Brennan's own argument that would count against the possibility of such discretionary restraint being possible to apply even-handedly. In particular, Brennan makes appeal to the informational properties of market interaction: that they enable gains in regard to the transmission of information in a way that allows for highly effective coordination of activity and an ability to maximize the use of localized knowledge without centralized command or planning (Brennan 2014, pp. 83, 91f.) . 9 But, just as it is hard to effectively gather the knowledge necessary to plan how to maximize productive activity, it would be equally hard for any individual to gauge how their own economic decisions affect the interests of others, such that they could judge where best to restrain themselves from competitive behaviour. The likelihood is that some of the imperfections or biases in information gathering or processing would prevent individuals from accomplishing this in a balanced or fair manner. 10 For instance, people may tend to employ an availability heuristic that leads them to overestimate the importance of the interests of those with whom they have regular face-to-face contact, at the expense of more distant others. In order for discretionary restraint to work, therefore, Brennan would need to be utopian not just about motivation but also about the ability of individuals to access and use information. But, were he to be utopian about the epistemic capacities of individual actors, then one of the key arguments in favour of a market system -its informational efficiency -is no longer available to him.
Competition and the gains of markets
Similar to the above point, there are some reasons to think that any attempt to totally contain or humanize competitive practice is inconsistent with a wider defence of capitalism. Competition is a crucial component of any instrumental defence of the market mechanism, contributing to both its motivational and informational benefits. 11 This is one of the reasons why competition is often held to be a welcome economic force. For instance, for the other characters in the Mickey Mouse Clubhouse Village, the fact that Minnie's "Bowtique" comes under commercial pressure may actually be welcome, in that it may encourage her to work to produce new designs more often or open her store at evenings and weekends. The competitive presence of Willie's store provides Minnie with a powerful personal incentive to exert herself in ways that she may find uncomfortable, but can provide a benefit to others. While an agreement between Willie and Minnie would reduce her discomfort, it will likewise reduce this wider benefit.
10 Work in social psychology and behavioural economics has revealed that there are many ways in which human judgement is systematically prone to bias due to its reliance on simple heuristics. See, for example Kahneman et al. (1982) . 11 For an interesting discussion of the interrelationship between these two strands of the instrumental justification of markets, see Heath (2014) .
Further to this, competition also plays a key role in epistemic arguments in favour of markets. It is not simply the case that whoever works hardest out of Willie and Minnie will sell the most bows. They will, instead, examine all of the different aspects of their businesses to see whether they can improve their methods or their products. They may experiment with different materials, different designs and different pricing strategies. They will watch to see how these changes affect profitability. Does the use of more abundant (and so cheaper) materials impact the amount of bows sold? Which colours and designs are most popular? Do customers buy more if a salesperson talks to them, or if they are left alone to browse? The competitive situation will require that ideas and adaptations that have a profitable impact will be further developed, while those that have a negative outcome will no longer be used. As a result, over time, the proprietors will gain a much deeper appreciation of a wide range of elements of their business: how big the overall market for bows is; the preferences and tastes of bow consumers; how much they are willing to pay; what the most efficient production and retail techniques are, and so on. The fact of competition between businesses against the background of a functioning price system enables a process through which the bow store owners discover a wide range of previously unknown knowledge.
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But, a fundamental feature of this process is the functioning of a negative feedback mechanism: it requires that some efforts do not meet with success and that sometimes the respective businesses experience a threat to sales or profits, as this signals to the store owners that their efforts would be better deployed in different ways. 13 An arrangement between the store owners to limit competition is, in effect, an agreement to dampen this particular type of signal. This may make the business owners less likely to risk new ideas, or more prepared to stick with wasteful methods for longer than they might otherwise have done. Since the ability of a market system to effectively transmit signals across an economy is vital to its instrumental defence, 14 defenders of markets will require vigorous processes of competition. Competition, then, is vital to the motivational and informational success of markets. Thus, to the extent that increased instrumental efficiency or overall gains in wealth feature in a justification of capitalism, competitive and 12 This is why Hayek (2002) refers to competition as a discovery procedure. 13 'Th[e] mutual adjustment of individual plans is brought about by a process that we have learned to call negative feedback… It is precisely through the disappointment of expectations that a high degree of agreement of expectations is brought about.' (Hayek 2002, p. 15) . 14 'When it comes to making maximal use of the information needed to run a large economy, nothing beats the market.' (Brennan 2014, p. 91) . oppositional behaviour will always be necessary. This means that Brennan cannot successfully appeal to the positive outcomes of markets to support his argument, if he is at the same time denying the oppositional behaviour upon which they function. 
Competition and economic freedom
Another reason to suppose that there may be limits to what can be achieved, even under utopian conditions, via a simple reliance upon discretionary restraint is that Brennan does himself seek to limit discretionary scope when he endorses rules of private property. He argues that, no matter how benevolent the characters within the Mickey Mouse Clubhouse Village, they would still want exclusive personal control over the particular objects needed to give direction and meaning to their own plans and purposes. A significant component of this argument is the degree to which clear frameworks of rules can be helpful in coordinating behaviour in a way that allows us the free exercise of our own wills:
Imagine everything belonged to everybody. Now imagine everyone loves each other very much. Still, every time you go to use something, you'd have to check and see if anyone else needed or wanted to use it. ("Hey, does anyone need the laptop right now?") Or, otherwise, we'd have to develop conventions such that you knew, without asking permission, that you could use particular things at certain times. ("Oh, good, it's 6 p.m., now it's my turn to use one of the village laptops.") There's something deeply annoying about both of those scenarios, even if we love others as much as we love ourselves. (Brennan 2014, p. 80) 16 Brennan argues here that, even though the possibility exists within a group of good natured fellows to find arrangements that would be supportive of the pursuit of personal plans, there also exist good reasons why individuals may want to go beyond informal arrangements to implement clear frameworks of rules.
The same argument might be extended towards competitive practice. If Minnie Mouse is hit with a sudden burst of inspiration and feels like working long into the night upon a new bow creation, she could check with Willie first to 15 Brennan does make appeal to both the motivational and informational gains of markets, although his account of utopia can only incorporate epistemic gain, as perfect motivation is part of the utopian stipulation. (Brennan 2014, pp. 13ff., 90ff.) . 16 Of course, there is plenty of scope for disagreement with Brennan on this point. Commonownership situations need not be found annoying by those party to them, or be by necessity less practical or productive than privatized alternatives. For a detailed, and empirically informed, exploration of such issues, see Ostrom (2015) . see how it impacts upon him. ("Hey Willie, would this new design of bow make your stock look old and tatty by comparison?"). She could recall the example Willie had set in restraining his own competitive activity. ("Since Willie has restricted himself to working eight-hour days, I should do the same now.") In the same way that attempts to constantly negotiate access to objects might be considered an annoyance, any attempt to constrain competitive behaviour purely through a reliance upon benevolent motives appears just as likely to be felt as a hindrance to the effective pursuit of personal plans. Indeed, granting extensive economic freedom and exclusive control over objects is, in effect, a way of saying that individuals do not have to exercise discretion in their behaviour, except for reciprocally respecting the rights of others.
17 As a result, although the full pursuit of their own plans has a significant impact upon the plans of others, even perfectly motivated individuals could not be expected to mitigate this impact by refraining from competitive or oppositional behaviour. The above argument has demonstrated how, when individual people are left free to pursue their own varied personal plans, some of the resulting social interactions have an unavoidably rivalrous character, as people are forced into competition for the resources necessary to realize their own ends. Equally, the oppositional standing of these plural goals cannot be dissolved by appeal to benevolent motives, meaning that even under utopian circumstances, capitalism would require competition.
18 What, then, might explain its absence from
Brennan's account of capitalist utopia? One possibility is that the Mickey Mouse Clubhouse Village is utopian in ways beyond simply the stipulation of the pure moral motives of its characters. So, within the show, it is helpful for the youthful audience that the characters each possess differing ambitions, as this reinforces their distinct personalities. Meanwhile, the world of the Mickey Mouse Clubhouse may simply not be characterized by the sort of scarcity that leads to competition over resources. Yet, while either of these factors might help to explain the absence of competition, they would also undermine the utility of Brennan's example, as the conditions they describe, absent scarcity or clashing interests, would render much debate about justice or the need for a systematic scheme for economic coordination (such as capitalist markets) moot.
Of course, recognition that a situation of utopian capitalism would still feature competitive behaviour in itself says nothing about the plausibility or attractiveness of the ideal. Brennan may argue that, even if we recognize the constraining impact of rival plans, individuals may still prefer to endorse a capitalist ideal than any alternative system. In order to consider this, I will now turn to assess whether the reasons of the morally perfect characters within capitalist utopia might be altered by a recognition of the inevitable presence of competitive behaviour.
Capitalism or conditions of fair competition?
The overall point that Brennan wishes to make in drawing attention to the Mickey Mouse Clubhouse Village as an example of a capitalist utopia is that we should not overlook the moral value of a capitalist system and simply view it as a mere compromise with human motivational frailty. Instead, he maintains that, under utopian conditions in which positive intentions could be assured, there would still be strong reasons to value a capitalist socioeconomic system. In particular, he holds that the value individuals assign to their own personal plans and purposes would lead them to desire a system that would allow scope for the fullest agency in pursuit of their intended goals. This, he argues, provides sound evidence to believe that, under utopian conditions, individuals would wish to have a system characterized by rightfully guaranteed access to particular objects, free trade within markets and the widest possible space of secure economic freedom. In response to this, I maintain that, even if we accept Brennan's normative starting point in the high value of individual goals and aims, an appreciation of the inherently rivalrous nature of these aims calls into question the extent to which strongly held property rights and rights of economic freedom are necessarily the system that would be ultimately endorsed by well-intentioned individuals.
To make this case, I wish to reconsider the competitive situation that exists between Minnie Mouse's "Bowtique" and Willie the Giant's store "Bow Selector". In the previous section I argued that it would be problematic to expect the competition between these two stores to be restrained purely through discretionary choice, as this would leave too much potential for the arbitrary favouring of some interests over others, while also potentially undermining the search for the most effective overall use of resources. Having said this, I have not denied that well-intentioned Willie might have a desire to act to further the interests of others and to secure for them too the best chance to pursue their own plans and goals. Thus, while he might be desperate to commit himself to advancing his passion for bows, he might concede that the depth of his single-minded pursuit of bow-making is unusual and so should not be expected of others. He might also admit to his good fortune in having significant financial resources at his disposal and not want bow-making to become a profession that is unsustainable for those who do not share his favourable position. At the same time, though, he might also recognize the interests of potential bow consumers and still want to deliver the best quality bow to them at the best possible price. In other words, he may have a fine appreciation for the complex range of interests at stake and the impossibility of a solution that does not involve some compromise to at least some of these interests. What he may wish for, in response to this, would be to find a means through which a balance may be found between these interests, such that each individual could have clear expectations about the way in which they should pursue their goals and the sort of impediments that they might face in this pursuit.
So, Willie might be quite happy to give up certain specific portions of his economic freedom and to endorse a rule that limits the number of hours in the working week, providing this rule managed to strike a balance between his own interests, Minnie's interests and the interests of bow consumers. Equally, recognizing his good fortune in benefitting from favourable changes in land price prior to the sale of his farm, he may feel that he does not personally deserve exclusive control over all of the money he received from the sale. He might therefore be quite happy for this money to help fund a design school that will help ensure future designers -not just of bows, but of a full range of products -have the best possible chance of realizing their own dreams and goals. Now, my intention here is not to defend any one specific substantive account of competitive fairness, but rather to instead demonstrate that it is not obvious that well-intentioned individuals, who cared both about their own ends and the goals of their fellows, would come to endorse the capitalist solution as Brennan describes it. That is to say, while they would certainly recognize the need for some degree of personal control over spaces or objects, and would value a wide scope of personal productive freedom to pursue their plans, they might admit that these concerns could quite consistently end up being overridden. In particular, in recognizing that their varied plans may come into opposition, I maintain that these utopian individuals would want to ensure that the rules they endorsed not only provided a framework that allowed for the successful exercise of their own agency but also ensured a fair chance for all to do likewise. So, this may, indeed, lead them to endorse competitive markets as a fair procedure for uncovering the most efficient use of overall resources, given the varied range of plans that are held. Yet, at the same time, this endorsement might be qualified by a wish to insulate people's lives to some degree from market forces, to retain a secure space of individual agency for each person that is shielded from concerns of economic productivity. 19 And, being individuals of utopian character, even those favoured by the close proximity between their desired goals and productive efficiency would recognize their fortune and be prepared to abide by some form of limitation. With this in mind, it seems inevitable to speculate as to what this might mean in terms of real world political concerns. Although a full answer to such questions would require far more detail than I am able to provide here, I will, before concluding, offer some brief thoughts. Firstly, it is worth noting that some problems re-emerge immediately in a system where a wider range of motivations -from benevolent to wholly self-interested -is present. As a result, some restrictions upon economic activity would be necessary to ensure competitive conduct was appropriate, preventing manipulation, exploitation or the creation of monopolies, while ensuring that genuine public goods would be supplied in sufficient quantities. But, these are measures that are likely to win support from a great many defenders of capitalism.
Beyond this, though, there are ways in which a concern for fair competition might offer a greater challenge to straightforward capitalist practice. I suggest that three areas of focus in particular stand out. Firstly is the idea that background social conditions under capitalism may, without any specifically wrongful action, produce situations characterized by competitive imbalance, with some individuals significantly favoured and others disadvantaged. 20 So, even if concern is primarily for the ability of individuals to follow their own plans and purposes, there is a strong argument that the institutional arrangements of a property-owning democracy -where institutional design seeks to ensure that some interests will not be systematically favoured over others -may be found preferable to relatively unhindered forms of capitalism.
21
19 For arguments that time beyond essential tasks (inclusive of both paid and necessary unpaid labour) should be considered as a specific component of theories of distributive justice see Goodin (2010) and Rose (2014) . 20 'We might say: in this case the invisible hand guides things in the wrong direction and favors an oligopolistic configuration of accumulations that succeeds in maintaining unjustified inequalities and restrictions on fair opportunity.' (Rawls 2005, p. 267) . 21 'If we care about agency, including economic agency, why not favor property-owning democracy? By widely dispersing control over productive resources we can give each citizennot just the rich -an effective ability to chart her own economic course in life. Moreover, by limiting the intergenerational transmission of advantage and guarding against political domination, we ensure that future generations will continue to have opportunities for economic self-authorship -by starting a business, say -in ways that engage their sense of personal responsibility and self-respect.' (Stilz 2014, p. 436) . See also the contributions within O' Neill and Williamson (2012) .
A second concern would be with regard to the stakes of competitive interaction. In the same way that many sports mandate restrictions upon the competitive environment in order to prevent outcomes that are highly detrimental to player safety, there may be some consequences of economic competition that, even though freely arrived at within fair background circumstances, we do not wish to countenance. A willingness to endorse a competitive environment need not require the widespread employment of winner-takes-all principles that could potentially leave losing competitors in positions of destitution. This means that there may be room for social policies that act to shield agents from some highly unfavourable outcomes, either through the provision of some form of unconditional safety net or via the employment of different, and less stark, staking patterns of reward.
22 Beyond this, a third and final concern is that there may be situations in which the intensity of competition comes itself to be judged to be problematic. Indeed, where goods have positional qualities they may be prone to arms race dynamics in which the competition between individuals creates a costly collective action problem. For, purchases seeking a positional advantage can often be mutually offsetting in a competitive environment, leading to a situation where much effort or expense is, in effect, wasted. Within a generally competitive scheme, therefore, it will be necessary to find ways to distinguish between healthy and unhealthy competitive dynamics. Where competition for a particular good is likely to become problematic, it may be the case that its trade ought to be regulated or restricted.
23
Overall, then, were the well-intentioned members of a utopian situation to confront the oppositional standing of their plans to those of their fellows, it does not seem unreasonable to expect that a concern with securing conditions of fair competition could lead them to endorse a socioeconomic system that would diverge significantly from Brennan's capitalist utopia of strong property rights, extensive market trade and the securing of a wide area of economic freedom.
Conclusion
Brennan ends his argument by echoing Robert Nozick's (1974) depiction of capitalism not as a single utopia, but rather as a framework for multiple utopias.
22 The idea of "stakes fairness" was termed by Lesley Jacobs (2004) . A recent attempt to develop this idea and to specify a range of alternative principles for the division of stakes, beyond a winner-takes-all approach can be found in Brown (2015) . 23 For an argument that the positional character of education makes it unsuitable for market trade, see Halliday (2015) . See also Brighouse and Swift (2006) .
A capitalist utopia, he argues, is a place in which we are free to shape the world around us in ways that please us:
The Mickey Mouse Clubhouse Village could be not just a utopia, but a meta-utopia in which you choose the utopia that's best for you… It leaves everyone free to create or inhabit the utopia of her choice with others who also choose to live there. It offers a framework in which inhabitants of one utopia can take joy in co-existing and contemplating the lifestyles of the inhabitants of other utopias. (Brennan 2014, p. 98) However, once the inherently competitive nature of capitalism is acknowledged, we can see that this picture, in which each individual freely follows her own dreams, is only a partial truth. For, outside of conditions of absolute plenty, each individual will have to either compromise her goals so that they better fit with the goals of others, or will have to compete vigorously to secure the resources necessary to realize her utopia, in the process potentially undermining the ability of others to successfully fulfil their own ends.
This oppositional structure is not something that results from negative attitudes or motivation, but is rather an essential and ineliminable feature of capitalism. Therefore, while Brennan's book is important and effective in drawing attention to the value of plural ends and individual agency as attractive components of a utopian system, its obscuring of competitive forces leaves it unable to demonstrate that these concerns lead to a commitment to capitalism as the ideal form of socioeconomic organization.
